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End-of-life issues involving small babies are particularly challenging for doctors, particularly 
pediatricians as there are complex issues involved, including long-term disabilities (1) and 
the parents’ wishes (1). Evaluations can be based on statistical risks (2) and case-by-case 
issues. Some authors (3) suggest that intensive care can be withheld when consciousness is 
compromised, but that raises questions about what level of  consciousness equates to a baby 
being completely compromised (4). Other authors have questioned whether suspending 
therapies when the baby is not at their end-of-life is ethically right. Concerns have also been 
expressed that there is a risk that babies lives are undervalued, in comparison with older 
patients, because their life support is removed more easily than when adults have a similar 
prognosis (5). Moreover, some think that the vital treatment that babies receive cannot be 
deliberately stopped, even in the absence of signs of consciousness, for example on the basis 
that life is sacred; the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 introduced legislation was strongly 
protective of the rights and interests of disabled children in the USA and left little room for 
non-treatment decisions based on their quality of life or on the parents’ interests.  
Most doctors use the best interest principle for difficult cases, namely putting themselves in 
their patients’ shoes and deciding on their behalf. The problem with this is that doctors hold 
individual views and often disagree about what is actually in the best interest of a baby. 
Those who advocate  therapies and those who want them withheld both say that they have the 
baby’s best interests at heart. Diekema has expressed the need for a criterion that is more 
robust than the best interest principle, namely the harm principle (6), which is based on 
avoiding harm rather than promoting the babies’ best interests. However this principle faces 
the same issues as the best interest principle: what is harm and who can define it? Physical 
harm exists, but moral, existential and economic types of harm are also possible. Some 
clinicians also think that the harm threshold necessary to withdraw therapies can be extended 
to cases of blindness, paralysis or any physical or mental handicap. However, this approach 
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has been challenged as being disrespectful and stigmatising towards people with disabilities 
(7).  
An easy and robust parameter is needed to decide when an invasive treatment is excessive 
and this needs to have the lowest possible margin of error. One option is to consider what we 
call the pain principle as a reliable marker for this decision, namely the presence of pain or 
stress. Pain and stress are objective markers, because they can be measured. We can 
acknowledge if babies are really feeling these undesirable sensations, using direct 
observation, asking the patient when possible, or with subjective or multifactorial algometric 
scales. We can also score pain and stress by measuring the production of acute-stress 
hormones (8), measuring skin impedance, which is a sign of alterations in the autonomic 
nervous system due to pain or stress (9), or looking for pain-related electroencephalogram  
changes (10). Good tools for pain assessment in non-verbal patients are available and have 
been validated, but they are scarcely used and some are hard to use. In addition, a lot of effort 
is needed to apply and refine them in end-of-life settings. Some authors have also determined 
the threshold that separates severe from mild pain, using some of the aforementioned tools, 
and these findings need to be refined by scientific societies. We recognise that pain and stress 
are two different feelings and distinct phenomena, but we have considered them as a single 
entity in this paper as they can be measured using the same markers. 
 
Thus, we propose using the pain principle to assess whether an invasive treatment is to be 
carried out. It can be so summarised as follows: medical procedures should be measured and 
then withdrawn or reduced to a lower intensity level when measurable pain or stress are 
excessive and untreatable. Two examples of this reduction are: removing a peritoneal dialysis 
set, when it can no longer be tolerated, or moving from endotracheal invasive ventilation to 
mask ventilation.. So, the main concern in end-of-life care shifts from dealing with death to 
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dealing with pain and the main goal becomes relieving pain. A collateral effect of this is that 
it can reduce the patients’ life expectancy, but this will be an unwanted consequence of our 
attempt to shield the baby from pain, rather than a deliberate choice.  
 
In Figure 1, we propose an algorithm for the pain principle. We have considered that a 
moderate amount of stress or pain can be accepted in the general population, including 
disabled babies, if it leads to advantages for the patient in the future. However, any level of 
stress is unacceptable in babies with irreversible loss of consciousness and social interaction 
and any invasive treatments should be reduced in intensity, or made less invasive, at the first 
sign of pain or stress. Of course, all efforts should be made to minimise and overcome pain 
before saying that pain or stress are too severe and  international guidelines on this are 
essential. We also feel that brain damage should be diagnosed based on solid evidence, such 
as an electroencephalogram or a magnetic resonance imaging scan, and not just on a 
statistical or probabilistic basis, namely just gestational age (2). The pain principle is not a 
substantial alternative to the best interest principle, but it is a pragmatic way of applying it. 
Importantly, the pain principle does not recommend that clinicians arbitrarily remove vital 
treatments, but it does suggest their progressive removal, or a decrease in intensity, allowing 
the use of palliative care, when they become excessively burdensome to the patient.  
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Figure 1: The pain principle algorithm 
 
 
Legend: 
A distinction is made for babies with irreversible loss of consciousness and the rest of the 
population, because in the former group, no level of stress or pain is acceptable.  
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